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The 2002 farm bill has beencriticized from day one. Free-trade advocates criticized the
significant increase in domestic sub-
sidies for U.S. farmers at a time when
the rest of the world was seemingly
moving toward more liberalized pro-
duction and trade. Small-farm advo-
cates criticized the ability of large
farms to bypass payment limitations
through the use of commodity cer-
tificates. Conservation advocates
thought they had accomplished a
major feat with the Conservation Se-
curity Program, but implementation
rules and subsequent funding cuts
have shown that the program will
have little short-term impact. And
rural development advocates criti-
cized the bill for its continued focus
on supporting commodities rather
than rural income enhancement.
Most groups criticize the farm
bill because they would like to ac-
complish something different with
the legislation. Disagreement and
debate about the objectives of farm
policy is a critical part of the policy
discussion. But it is also crucial to
know if the current commodity pro-
grams are in fact accomplishing
what Congress wants them to do. If
not, then they should be reformed,
even if Congress does not alter its
policy objectives.
It is not easy to pin down what
farm programs are supposed to ac-
complish. The rhetoric of program
defenders offers little guidance be-
cause the arguments employed are
usually based on myths rather than
facts. For example, farm programs
are often touted as providing con-
sumers with inexpensive food when
the reality is that the retail price of
food bears little relationship to the
price of supported commodities.
Since 9/11, some say we need farm
programs for national security rea-
sons when almost all analysts sug-
gest that aggregate production of
food would change little if we did
away with the programs. Others say
that current farm programs en-
hance rural vitality. But the data
show that the least economically
viable rural regions are those that
have become most dependent on
farm subsidies. The biggest myth is
that farm programs help vulnerable
small family farmers when it is
abundantly clear that it is the large
commercial operations that are
helped the most.
Judging Congress by its actions
instead of its words, we conclude
that the primary objective of cur-
rent commodity programs is to
support income for the U.S. field
crop sector. Furthermore, because
Congress set up crop-specific sup-
port levels, we also conclude that
Congress wants to support income
on a crop-by-crop basis. Various
interpretations of what is meant by
farm income could be made, but
because Congress has little con-
trol over production costs, an ap-
propriate measure of Congress’s
intent is to spend money so that
total revenue for each supported
crop does not fall below a speci-
fied level. We calculate this level
for each crop by simple arithmetic.
The target for each crop’s rev-
enue is assumed to be expected
production times the loan rate plus
the maximum countercyclical pay-
ment rate times base acreage times
base yield for the countercyclical
payment program plus the direct
payment rate times base acreage
times base yield for the direct pay-
ment program. These calculations
result in target revenues of approxi-
mately $25 billion for corn and
$15.5 billion for soybeans. Given
these targets, a taxpayer-cost-effi-
cient farm program would spend
money to bring revenue up to the
target level when market income
falls short of the targeted amount.
When market revenue exceeds this
amount, then an efficient program
would cut off support.
DO CURRENT PROGRAMS HIT
THEIR TARGETS?
Figure 1 shows that current farm
programs have done a poor job at
meeting their objective for corn
and soybeans. In 2002, market rev-
enue for corn fell short of the target
amount by about $3.8 billion, yet
farm programs paid out only $2.1
billion. In 2003, corn farmers re-
ceived $2.1 billion in support, yet
their market income was about
equal to the target level. And in
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Printed with soy ink
2004, market income fell short of
the target by $1.4 billion, but we es-
timate that payments will exceed
$7 billion. For soybeans, market in-
comes exceeded target incomes in
2003 and 2004 and the shortfall in
2002 was only $130 million. But to-
tal payments exceeded $2.1 billion
over this period.
When a policy tool fails to hit a
target, the usual explanation is that
the wrong tool was used. In 2002,
market income was low because
U.S. aggregate yield was below trend
levels and prices did not increase
enough to compensate. The only
support producers received in 2002
(ignoring ad hoc disaster payments
for now) was in the form of direct
payments and these payments were
not large enough to compensate for
low aggregate yields. Furthermore,
in 2002 many corn regions had good
yields. The low aggregate corn yield
was caused by drought in the west-
ern Corn Belt. But all regions re-
ceived direct payments, regardless
of regional income levels.
The largest miss occurred in
the current 2004 crop year. Record
yields led to record production.
Prices fell dramatically, but there
was only a small shortfall in market
revenue. This type of low-price,
high-yield year is what really trig-
gers payments under current farm
programs. We project that the cur-
rent corn program will overshoot
its target by almost $6 billion.
The soybean misses largely
have been caused by direct pay-
ments arriving even when soybean
revenue meets or exceeds its target
amount. In addition, harvest prices
in 2004 were low enough to trigger
loan deficiency payments, even
though subsequent price increases
have enabled farmers to market
their crops at much higher prices.
Thus, soybean farmers are pro-
jected to receive almost $1 billion
in payments for their 2004 crop
even though total market revenue
is projected to exceed the target
level by $1 billion.
The mismatch between re-
gional payments received and re-
gional market revenue is more
pronounced with soybeans. Much
of the 2003 price strength was a re-
sult of very poor yields in Nebraska,
western Iowa, and South Dakota.
Yet farmers in these regions re-
ceived the same direct payment as
farmers in regions with normal
yields. This illustrates the poor per-
formance of current farm programs
in compensating for low regional
yields. Some might say that disaster
payments in 2002 and 2003 partly
compensated for these low regional
yields. But if Congress recognizes
the need for supplemental assis-
tance caused by widespread low
regional yields, wouldn’t it be sen-
sible to develop a new farm policy
tool that automatically accounts for
low yields as well as low prices? To
find such a tool, Congress could
look beyond USDA’s Farm Service
Agency and focus its attention on
another USDA agency.
INCOME SUPPORT FROM THE RISK
MANAGEMENT AGENCY
For the 2005 crop year, we esti-
mate that almost 6 million acres
of U.S. corn and soybeans will be
insured with Group Risk Income
Protection (GRIP). This product
provides a guarantee that county
revenue will not fall below 90 per-
cent of the product of expected
market price and trend yield. This
product seems ideally suited to
hit congressional revenue targets.
Either low prices or low yields can
trigger a payment. But low prices
by themselves will not trigger a
payment if yields are high enough
to raise revenue above the 90 per-
cent level. And low yields will not
trigger a payment if prices are
strong enough. In addition, if pay-
ments arrive when aggregate mar-
ket revenue exceeds its target
level, then at least the payments
would flow to those regions that
experienced inadequate revenue
because of low yields.
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FIGURE 1. DO FARM BILL PAYMENTS ARRIVE WHEN REVENUE IS LOW?
FIGURE 2. WOULD GRIP PAYMENTS ARRIVE WHEN REVENUE IS LOW?
To determine how well GRIP
might perform as a commodity
policy, we simulated GRIP payments
to farmers assuming that a 90 per-
cent GRIP policy was given to all
corn and soybean farmers in 2002,
2003, and 2004. Figure 2 shows that
GRIP does not perform as well as
one might expect. For corn, GRIP
would have overcompensated farm-
ers in 2004 and undercompensated
them in 2002. For soybeans, GRIP
did a good job at not overcompen-
sating farmers for aggregate losses
in 2002 and 2003, but GRIP would
have greatly overcompensated
farmers in 2004.
The reason GRIP performs so
erratically is that its guarantees are
based on futures prices. In 2002, the
expected corn price was $2.30/bu
and the expected soybean price was
only $4.53/bu. These prices are not
adequate to provide the level of pro-
tection desired by Congress. In
2004, expected prices were dramati-
cally higher at $2.93 and $7.27. The
overcompensation in 2004 from
GRIP is a direct result of market
prices providing more protection
than desired by Congress. While a
market-based revenue product is
desirable as an insurance product,
it is less desirable in a national com-
modity policy.
A NEW REVENUE-BASED
COMMODITY POLICY
An easy fix for one of the weaknesses
of GRIP as a commodity policy is to
replace futures prices with a fixed
price to calculate county revenue
guarantees. An easy fix for the over-
compensation that occurs when
farmers use low harvest prices to
maximize marketing loan benefits is
to calculate payments based on sea-
son-average prices, much like we do
with the current countercyclical pay-
ment program. Figure 3 shows that
such a modified GRIP program would
closely match payments with rev-
enue shortfalls if all corn and soy-
FIGURE 3. WOULD MODIFIED GRIP PAYMENTS ARRIVE WHEN REVENUE IS LOW?
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Many of Iowa’s public lakeshave been adversely af-fected by sediment, nutri-
ents, or other nonpoint pollution.
Iowa is grappling with the pres-
sures of balancing federal water
quality requirements, tight conser-
vation budgets, concern for envi-
ronmental preservation and
restoration, and economic viability
of rural areas. Efforts to improve
water quality in many lakes are
likely to entail significant eco-
nomic costs. These costs can be
public, such as when state re-
sources are used to fund cleanup
efforts, or private, such as altering
land uses or farming practices, ex-
panding municipal treatment facili-
ties, or other investments. Before
scarce funds are invested in
cleaner water, it is imperative to
know how much Iowans value
cleaner water.
VALUE MEASURES
The value of cleaner water is often
missing from discussion of state
water quality problems. What
value do Iowans place on the pro-
tection of water resources in the
state? What value would they
place on improvement in quality
levels? Conceptually, the eco-
nomic value of water quality im-
provements in Iowa lakes is the
maximum amount the citizenry is
willing to pay to obtain those im-
provements. This is the standard
economic definition of the value
of a good, as it represents the
value of other goods and services
that people are willing to forgo in
order to acquire or preserve the
good in question (water quality in
this case). This “willingness-to-
pay” concept can appropriately be
used by policymakers in deciding
how to spend limited public mon-
ies. While difficult to measure,
economists and limnologists (who
study water biology and chemis-
try) at Iowa State have a large re-
search project underway to
generate estimates of this value
for water quality improvement at
over 125 lakes in the state (for de-
tails, visit www.card.iastate.edu/
environment).
In addition to the value of wa-
ter quality improvements, citizens
of local communities and regions
are often interested in another
measure related to environmental
improvements. They want to know
the amount of economic activity
those improvements might stimu-
late. Typically, this economic im-
pact is measured in total dollars of
spending generated locally by the
environmental improvement or
the number of jobs created. This
type of information is particularly
relevant for those interested in
promoting and maintaining the
viability of local communities.
The City of Storm Lake in
Buena Vista County is one such
community. Community leaders in
the Storm Lake area have pursued
an aggressive water quality and
community development effort
that has been termed “Project
Awaysis” (see the project Web
site: www.awaysis.com). This pro-
posal encompasses both water
quality improvements in the lake
and substantial economic devel-
opment for the local community.
Included in the plans are a new
public beach, a lighthouse, a rede-
signed municipal golf course, a
renovated campground, family
cabins, an 80-room lodge, an in-
door/outdoor water park, a
countywide bike trail, an interpre-
tive center, and other amenities.
ECONOMIC IMPACT ANALYSIS
As part of their planning efforts,
members of the Storm Lake Area
Development Corporation were
interested in having an economic
impact analysis undertaken. They
wanted to estimate the effects of
spending by an increased number
Water Cleanup: What’s the Economic Impact for Iowa Communities?
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of visitors that would likely result
after dredging of the lake and con-
struction of these additional facili-
ties and attractions. The first step in
the analysis was to take advantage
of information already collected by
the statewide lake valuation study
by economists at CARD and Iowa
State University. The study, which
was jointly funded by the Environ-
mental Protection Agency and the
Iowa Department of Natural Re-
sources, included data on annual
visitation rates to Iowa lakes, as
well as on-site surveys in Storm
Lake that collected data on visitor
activities and spending patterns
during these visits. The primary ac-
tivities engaged in on these visits
included boating, fishing, camping,
and hiking. Based on this informa-
tion, we were able to estimate that
over 267,000 visitors came to the
area because of the lake in 2003. We
estimated the aggregate spending of
these Storm Lake visitors to be over
$22 million.
In the lake valuation study, visi-
tors were further asked how im-
provements to Storm Lake would
affect the number of visits they
make to the area. For purposes of
the economic impact analysis, this
question was interpreted to apply
to water quality improvements as
well as amenity investments such
as lodging to take advantage of the
cleaner lake. Based on their re-
sponses, we estimate that visitation
rates would increase by about 55
percent. At current spending rates,
the lake improvements are ex-
pected to increase direct tourism
spending by $12.6 million during
the summer season.
Since lake development is aimed
at year-round usage of the facilities
by including trails and an indoor wa-
ter park, we develop estimates of
additional spending occurring dur-
ing the remainder of the year. In ad-
dition to the water park activities,
other winter attractions include
snowmobiling, ice fishing, and cross-
country skiing on multi-purpose
trails. The proposed lodge would
also be promoted as a conference
facility intended to draw visitors
during the winter season. Winter
visitation rates are expected to be
lower, however; we estimate visitors
and spending to be only half of the
level seen during the summer
months. Using these rates, we esti-
mate additional spending of $6.3
million during winter months. Add-
ing this to the summer totals, lake
improvements are expected to re-
sult in an estimated annual increase
of $18.9 million in direct spending in
the Storm Lake area once the effects
from a fully developed set of facili-
ties are realized.
Based on the state averages for
the different retail and service sec-
tors, we expect about 27 new busi-
nesses to be supported by the
increase in sales activity. The ex-
penditure survey suggests that
about $3.5 million will be spent on
lodging in the region. Based on the
marketing analysis for the new
lodge, which estimated 80 rooms
and 70 percent occupancy at $85
per night, about $1.74 million will
be spent at this facility. This im-
plies that about $1.76 million will
spent at other lodging facilities,
supporting two to three additional
facilities based on state averages.
Income and employment associ-
ated with expanded visitation can be
estimated using an input-output (I-O)
model for the region. An I-O model is
essentially a general accounting sys-
tem tracking expenditures and pur-
chases among sectors in the local
economy. We use the IMPLAN data
and modeling system to configure an
I-O model for the economic region of
Buena Vista County. After the project
is completed, the local economy is
stimulated by new visitors making
retail purchases. The I-O model takes
these estimates of new tourism
spending, tracks them through the
rest of the economy, and summarizes
the secondary and overall purchases.
Overall, we estimate that the total
economic impacts on the region will
be $28.4 million of sales, $10.7 million
of new income, and 690 new jobs.
Most of this activity, including the
indirect and induced effects, is fo-
cused in the retail and service sector,
as indicated by the initial spending
survey. We estimate, after adjusting
for full-time equivalence, that the
earnings support about 490 full-time
positions.
AN ESSENTIAL COMPONENT
With the help of this impact report,
the community was able to acquire
an $8 million Vision Iowa grant to
assist with developing the project.
Awaysis Project Manager Mike Wil-
son says the economic impact
study, based upon the survey re-
sults and willingness-to-pay esti-
mates, was critical to the effort.
“Project planners had long believed
that the Awaysis development
would spur economic activity in
Storm Lake and Buena Vista
County,” he says. “The study pro-
vided independent, third-party
quantitative estimates of the eco-
nomic impact. Being able to refer to
that study was key to our effort to
help the community understand the
promise of Project Awaysis.” The
project’s development committee
plans to use the report to assist
with further marketing in the com-
munity and the region. ◆
Overall, we estimate
that the total economic
impacts on the region will
be $28.4 million of sales,
$10.7 million of new
income, and 690 new jobs.
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On November 10, 2004, thefirst confirmed case of soy-bean rust was found in the
continental United States, in Louisi-
ana. (Hawaii has had soybean rust
since 1994.) In the weeks that fol-
lowed, soybean rust was also con-
firmed in Alabama, Arkansas,
Florida, Georgia, Mississippi, Mis-
souri, South Carolina, and Tennes-
see. The most likely scenario as to
how soybean rust arrived in the
continental United States is via Hur-
ricane Ivan. Ivan formed in the At-
lantic in early September, brushed
the South American coast, and pro-
ceeded to strike the southeastern
United States, carrying rust spores
from Colombia and Venezuela. This
scenario highlights the ability of
soybean rust spores to travel over
large distances to create new areas
of infestation. Given this initial bout
with soybean rust, U.S. soybean pro-
ducers, researchers, and federal
and state governments have sought
to learn about soybean rust as
quickly as possible. Much of our
knowledge about soybean rust
comes from Brazil, where rust has
been a persistent issue for a few
years. We’ll look at Brazil’s response
to soybean rust and the possible
trade effects following an assess-
ment of our efforts so far in the
United States to mitigate this new
challenge to soybean production.
TREATMENTS AND RESOURCES
Even before soybean rust was discov-
ered in Louisiana, research and plan-
ning was underway in the United
States to deal with the disease. The
Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA) has registered three chemi-
cals—azoxystrobin, chlorothalonil,
and pyraclostrobin—for the treat-
ment of soybean rust. These chemi-
cals are preventative treatments in
that they protect soybean plants from
infestation and limit subsequent rust
development. Soybean rust spreads
by spores. Spore germination occurs
when soybean leaves experience pro-
longed wetness, temperatures be-
tween 59 and 86 degrees, and
humidity between 75 and 80 percent.
Under these conditions, pustules
form on soybean leaves within 5 to 10
days and spores are produced within
10 to 21 days. The treatment chemi-
cals prevent spore germination and
penetration. In April 2004, the USDA’s
Economic Research Service exam-
ined the possible impact of soybean
rust on the U.S. agricultural economy.
The study looked at regional and na-
tional scenarios of soybean rust infes-
tation, with yield impacts of up to 10
percent losses in affected areas. Un-
der assumed costs of $25 per acre for
treatment, the study indicated that
soybean rust would cause losses of
$640 million to $1.34 billion, depend-
ing on the severity of the outbreak.
Since the first sighting, efforts
have been directed at monitoring
the soybean rust situation in the
United States, keeping soybean
producers up to date on the latest
soybean rust information and treat-
ments, and outlining how the govern-
ment is responding and will continue
to respond to soybean rust. Various
federal and state government agen-
cies and university research centers
have set up Web sites to allow pro-
ducers to check the spread of soy-
bean rust and find the latest
information on the disease. For ex-
ample, USDA has set up a Web site,
www.usda.gov/soybeanrust, as a
clearinghouse on soybean rust infor-
mation. The site has links to other
sites or publications that help
producers identify soybean rust,
track the scouting and confirmation
of soybean rust in the United States,
outline fungicide information for
treatment, and provide information
on the interaction between govern-
ment programs and soybean rust
(such as crop insurance).
USDA has continued to scout for
soybean rust in the southeast in
2005. As of April 15, plant samples
from 94 counties across the South-
east have been checked for soybean
scouted, not found
scouted, confirmed
So
ur
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2005 soybean rust observation as of April 15
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rust. Rust has been found in three
counties just north of Tampa, Florida,
on overwintering kudzu in one case
and on new-season kudzu in the
other two. Kudzu can serve as a host
plant for soybean rust. Another USDA
Web site, www. sbrusa.net, has daily
updates on soybean rust scouting
and detection. The EPA has also ap-
proved seven chemical treatments
for soybean rust on an emergency
basis. Some of these chemicals are
preventative in nature, while others
are curative. These treatments are
restricted to certain states, cannot be
used until the state’s pesticide regu-
latory agency approves them, and
are limited to a certain number of
applications. These treatments will
be available on this emergency basis
through the 2007 soybean produc-
tion season. As the EPA is continuing
to explore other treatments and up-
dating treatment guidelines, produc-
ers will need to check for the latest
information on soybean rust treat-
ments as the season progresses.
MANAGING SOYBEAN RUST RISK
USDA’s Risk Management Agency
(RMA), the agency that manages
crop insurance, has also been active
in providing information to produc-
ers on how soybean rust is covered.
Losses due to soybean rust are cov-
ered by crop insurance as long as
producers follow “good farming
practices” in combating the disease.
A good farming practice is defined
as a practice, agreed to by agricul-
tural experts, that would allow the
crop to make normal progress to
maturity and produce the yield used
to set the crop insurance. RMA cur-
rently lists plant pathologists em-
ployed by the Cooperative State
Research, Education, and Extension
Service (CSREES), agricultural de-
partments of individual states, uni-
versities, and certified crop
consultants as agricultural experts.
Producers are required to keep in-
formed on the spread of soybean
rust and react if rust becomes a
threat to their production.
Producers should document
any advice they receive from agri-
cultural experts, along with their
efforts to combat soybean rust.
Crop insurance will cover yield
losses due to soybean rust even if
the crop was not treated under cer-
tain conditions, such as inaccessi-
bility of chemicals and/or equip-
ment in the area when the treat-
ment was needed. In these cases,
though, producers will have to
document that they attempted to
follow good farming practices. If
producers do not treat for soybean
rust because of the cost of treat-
ment, however, insurance coverage
will be reduced. Economic reasons
for non-treatment are not covered
by crop insurance. RMA has posted
updated information on crop insur-
ance and soybean rust on their Web
site (www.rma.usda.gov/news/
soybeanrust), including a list of ac-
ceptable documentation of farm
practices and discussion of rules
for organic producers.
BRAZIL, LEARNING IN THE FIELD,
AND TRADE IMPACTS
Brazilian soybean producers have
dealt with soybean rust since 2001.
It has been estimated that soybean
rust costs the Brazilian agricultural
economy $1 to $2 billion a year. The
techniques Brazilian producers use
to combat rust will likely need to be
adopted by U.S. producers, but this
will represent a significant shift in
U.S. soybean production practices.
Detection of soybean rust in its early
stages requires extensive scouting
within soybean fields. Producers
may need to scout their fields two to
four times a week for soybean rust
and inspect soybean leaves with a
magnifying glass. Fungicides that
combat soybean rust can be applied
preventively or at the first sign of
infection. There is some evidence
that the chemicals recently ap-
proved by the EPA on an emergency
basis are more effective than those
previously approved, but these
chemicals may have additional re-
strictions put on them because of
their emergency use status.
Failure of a producer to ac-
count for soybean rust can create a
twofold problem: possible yield
loss for the producer and a pos-
sible source of rust infection for
surrounding soybean producers.
Since the soybean rust spores are
lightweight, they can spread easily
across adjoining fields or over wide
areas, depending on wind and
weather patterns. Drought condi-
tions do not necessarily eliminate
soybean rust risk: some areas of
Brazil have experienced drought
but still had rust issues.
From a trade perspective, the
introduction of soybean rust to the
continental United States will
change the competitive balance.
When rust infected Brazil, U.S. pro-
ducers gained a competitive advan-
tage, as Brazilian soybean
producers faced the costs of com-
bating rust. Now, U.S. soybean pro-
ducers face similar additional costs.
The final impact on soybean mar-
kets will depend on how producers
in both countries continue to re-
spond to soybean rust and the rela-
tive cost of that response. Given the
patchwork of soybean fields, among
the corn, oat, and hay fields and
pastureland here in Iowa versus the
relative lack of crop diversity
around soybean fields in Brazil (soy-
bean fields surrounded by soybean
fields); it would seem that the Bra-
zilians have a competitive advan-
tage when dealing with soybean
rust. Treatments can be applied
more efficiently over a combined
area, as opposed to hopping from
field to field and trying to minimize
the impact on surrounding crops. ◆
From a trade perspective,
the introduction of soybean
rust to the continental
United States will change
the competitive balance.
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In August 2003, the United Statesand Australia asked the WorldTrade Organization (WTO) to
convene a panel to resolve an on-
going dispute concerning geo-
graphical indications (GIs). In
simple terms, the United States and
Australia charged that E.U. rules
governing the registration of GIs
discriminate against third-country
GI products (national treatment)
and fail to protect U.S. trademarks.
Given the range of sub-issues cov-
ered in the dispute, it is perhaps
not surprising that the WTO panel’s
March 2005 ruling left both sides
claiming victory.
LEVELING THE E.U. PLAYING FIELD
The European Union has invested a
great deal of political and eco-
nomic capital in promoting the use
of GIs to encourage producers to
abandon commodity production in
favor of producing high-quality,
high-value agricultural products
associated with geographical loca-
tion. One measure of the success of
these investments is the approxi-
mately 700 GIs (excluding wines
and spirits) currently registered in
the European Union and the con-
tinuous stream of applications to
register more products.
Whereas the United States in-
corporates protection of GIs within
its trademark system, the European
Union uses both a trademark sys-
tem and a separate system to pro-
tect GIs. As members of the WTO,
both are covered by WTO rules.
The WTO panel was convened to
determine whether the dual system
of the E.U. violates the rights of
non-E.U. WTO members. The WTO
authorizes the use of GIs among its
members to protect products with
unique attributes linked to well-de-
fined geographic areas from com-
Geographical Indications, the WTO, and Iowa-80 Beef
petition from similar products. GI
protection is spelled out in the
Agreement on Trade-Related As-
pects of Intellectual Property
Rights, or TRIPS Agreement, and the
European Union has consistently
fought to strengthen the protec-
tions for GI products under this
agreement. However, the United
States, Australia, and other WTO
members have charged that the Eu-
ropean Union’s own regulations in-
clude equivalence and reciprocity
conditions that prevent full protec-
tion of third-country GI products. In
short, the WTO panel was asked to
evaluate whether GI registration,
recognition, and protection under
EC Council Regulation No. 2081/92
violate the TRIPS Agreement.
Among the issues in the WTO
case are E.U. requirements that non-
E.U. countries adopt E.U. inspection
systems in order to register their GIs
in the European Union; require-
ments that non-E.U. governments be
involved in verifying and transmit-
ting applications to register GIs; and
limits on the ability of individuals or
groups from non-E.U. countries to
submit objections to GI registra-
tions. The European Union argued
that transmittal of applications is a
modality of the registration process,
which the United States did not
show was unreasonable or inconsis-
tent with the TRIPS Agreement. The
European Union further argued that
Article 22.2 of the TRIPS Agreement
does not confer a right to object to
the registration of a GI and that,
even if that right were conferred,
requiring that non-E.U. governments
transmit the objections is neither
excessive nor unreasonable.
WHO WON WHAT?
The panel confirmed that the rights
of U.S. trademark owners could not
be limited by GI regulations, except
in very specific and narrowly de-
fined circumstances. The European
Union can protect registered GI
names but cannot protect all the
linguistic variations of that name—
some of which may be brand names
from other countries. The panel
ruled that Regulation No. 2081/92
violates the TRIPS Agreement with
respect to the requirement that ap-
plications be submitted by govern-
ments, the requirement that
objections be submitted through
governments, and the requirement
that governments participate in in-
spection procedures. The panel sug-
gested that the regulation be
amended. On the other hand, the
panel ruled that the European
Union does not violate Article 22.2
of the TRIPS Agreement by allowing
the “coexistence” of GIs and prior
trademarks with similar names. In
other words, GIs are compatible
with non-E.U. trademark systems
and their trademarks. Thus, the
panel’s ruling upheld some of the
arguments from both sides.
DEVELOPING A GEOGRAPHIC-BASED
BRAND FOR IOWA BEEF
Given the differences in systems
for branding products based on
geographical linkages among WTO
member-countries, disagreements
will continue to require resolution.
Despite these disputes over the
methods of protection, however,
many countries agree on the value
of branding and promoting high-
Certification mark submitted to the
U.S. Patent and Trademark Office for
Iowa-80 Beef
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value agricultural products based
on geographical linkages. Building
on a body of research revealing the
benefits of GIs, product branding,
and animal identification, a recent
collaboration between the Center
for Agricultural and Rural Develop-
ment and the Iowa Beef Center at
Iowa State University seeks to use
Iowa’s long-held reputation for ex-
cellence in producing high-quality,
corn-fed beef to increase the profit-
ability of Iowa beef producers by
developing a branded beef associ-
ated with the state. The creation of
such a brand is now underway.
Iowa’s reputation has been built
on the state’s abundance of corn for
long-fed beef and cattle producers’
use of genetics that allow cattle to
produce well-marbled beef at a
young age, which promotes tender-
ness. These traits are especially im-
portant in high-value niche markets
in the United States and in countries
such as Japan, where consumers
value well-marbled, tender beef.
Japanese importers have long re-
ferred to high-quality corn-fed beef
from the United States as “I-80 beef”
because Interstate 80 provides a
rough landmark of the geographic
area where much U.S. corn-fed beef
is produced. To build on this exist-
ing identification of high-quality
beef in the most important export
market for U.S. beef, “Iowa-80 Beef”
was chosen as the brand name.
In addition to the geographical
linkage, Iowa-80 Beef will include
attributes that international and
domestic consumers are increas-
ingly using to define high-quality
beef. Ensuring uniform production
methods and the appropriate use of
the brand will allow Iowa beef pro-
ducers to label consistently high-
quality beef products and will allow
consumers to readily identify and
purchase Iowa-80 Beef.
The process of developing and
branding Iowa-80 Beef involves con-
current submissions to two sepa-
rate government entities. One part
of the process is to register for a
certification mark with the U.S.
Patent and Trademark Office
(USPTO). For Iowa-80 Beef, a certifi-
cation mark is more useful than a
standard trademark because, once
approved, the certification mark
can be used to label beef from any
Iowa producer who is willing to fol-
low the production specifications
for Iowa-80 Beef. The Iowa-80 Beef
brand cannot be sold, and registra-
tion through the USPTO includes
full rights to legal recourse for
trademark infringement.
The second part of the process is
to document the production and pro-
cessing systems for Iowa-80 Beef and
acquire certification of these systems
through USDA’s Agricultural Market-
ing Service (AMS). The Iowa-80 Beef
specifications are being set intention-
ally high to differentiate this beef as a
high-value, premium product. If the
Iowa-80 Beef program specifications
are accepted by USDA, the cattle
from which Iowa-80 Beef is produced
will be individually identified, trace-
able to the calf producer, age-verified,
and fed corn or corn co-products for a
minimum number of days in Iowa
feedlots. At the processing stage, car-
casses from Iowa-80 Beef animals will
be carefully segregated and will have
to meet minimum grade require-
ments for one of two quality levels:
carcasses that grade in the top one-
third of Choice or Prime and those
that grade mid-Choice.
To fully protect and promote
Iowa-80 Beef, both a U.S. certifica-
tion mark and a USDA-approved cer-
tification program are necessary.
The USDA-AMS can certify the pro-
duction and processing systems but
cannot protect the rights of produc-
ers against brand-name infringe-
ment. The USPTO certification mark
provides legal protection for Iowa-
80 Beef producers by certifying
“…that the goods in connection
with which it is used are produced
and processed according to specifi-
cations that include individual ani-
mal identification, genetics, ration
and number of days on feed in an
Iowa feedlot, maximum age of
steers and heifers at harvest, official
USDA beef grades, and minimum
number of days the beef is aged.”
This project is ongoing, and we
are awaiting approval of our appli-
cations for the Iowa-80 Beef certifi-
cation mark from the USPTO and an
Iowa-80 Beef certification program
by USDA-AMS. As work on this
project progresses, updates can be
found at www.card.iastate.edu/
i80beef.◆
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uct-specific support. Reporting
these payments in this way follows
the U.S. reporting of market loss
assistance payments. If this prece-
dent is followed, U.S. agricultural
support was at the limit in 1998
and exceeded the limits from 1999
to 2001.
The inclusion of the PFC and
direct payments in the reported
agricultural support has a double
impact. The U.S. reported support
actually increases by more than the
amount of the PFC and direct pay-
ments, because the other payments
that were in the non-product-spe-
cific support but were exempted by
de minimis rules must now be
counted. These other payments in-
clude the net benefits from the crop
insurance program, market loss as-
sistance payments, state credit pro-
Chad E. Hart
chart@iastate.edu
515-294-9911
In early March, the World TradeOrganization (WTO) released itsreport on the U.S. appeal in the cot-
ton dispute with Brazil. The appellate
ruling upheld much of the original
ruling, including the finding that pro-
duction flexibility contract (PFC) pay-
ments and direct payments are not
Green Box measures. This means that
these payments are to be counted
against the agricultural support limit
the United States agreed to under the
current WTO Agreement on Agricul-
ture. The rulings also state that the
payments from the Step 2 program,
marketing loan program, crop insur-
ance, production flexibility contracts,
market loss assistance, and other
listed programs grant support spe-
cific to cotton and that they caused
significant price suppression in the
world cotton market.
The rulings are a major blow to
U.S. agriculture because they call
into question whether the United
States has met its obligation to limit
domestic farm subsidies. The blue
line in Figure 1 shows the agricul-
tural support limit the United States
agreed to under the current WTO
Agreement on Agriculture. The
United States has reported agricul-
tural support to the WTO through
the 2001 marketing year. The gray
line shows the reported agricultural
support before the cotton ruling. By
these original reports, the United
States has complied with the WTO
agricultural support limits. The
United States reported PFC and di-
rect payments as exempt payments.
However, the cotton rulings indicate
that the PFC and direct payments
are not exempt. This drastically
changes the U.S. agricultural sup-
port picture. Figure 1 shows how
U.S. reported agricultural support
would look if the PFC and direct
payments are counted as non-prod-
The WTO Picture after the Cotton Ruling
FIGURE 1. WTO LIMITS AND REPORTED SUPPORT BEFORE AND AFTER THE
COTTON RULING
FIGURE 2. A BREAKDOWN OF U.S. AGRICULTURAL SUPPORT FOR THE
1999 MARKETING YEAR
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grams, and grazing and water subsi-
dies. For 1999, the addition of the
$5.47 billion in PFC payments turns
into a $12.88 billion increase in re-
ported support. Figure 2 shows a
breakdown of our revised estimate
of 1999 agricultural support. Mar-
keting loan benefits (through loan
deficiency payments or marketing
loan gains) account for 30 percent
of this support. PFC payments, mar-
bean farmers received such a policy
instead of current farm programs.
We calculated the Figure 3 re-
sults assuming that county revenue
guarantees are based on a $2.73
corn price and a $6.00 soybean
price. A payment was made to all
farmers in a county if the product of
the season-average price and the
yield per planted acre fell below 90
percent of the guarantee. Figure 3
shows that this new policy tool
would have avoided most of the
overcompensation of corn and soy-
bean farmers in 2004. The lower
overcompensation that occurred in
2003 results from payments being
targeted to those counties with low
yields. For corn in 2002, the new
policy would have come much
closer to hitting the revenue target
than either the current farm pro-
gram or the market-based GRIP.
WTO OUTLOOK
A GRIP-type farm program would be
classified as “Amber Box” under the
current WTO agriculture agreement
and the Doha Round framework be-
cause payments are tied to the cur-
rent price level and the farmers’
choices in planted acres. The pro-
gram could be modified to fit within
the “Blue Box” or the “Green Box.”
However, the modifications might
limit the effectiveness of the pro-
gram. The Blue Box modifications
would allow payments to be trig-
gered by price declines or regional
yield disasters, but the payments
could not change with national and/
or farm shifts in planted areas. Green
Box modifications would allow price
and/or yield reductions to trigger
payments and some updating for re-
gional shifts in crop production; but
shifts in farm production would not
be accounted for and the program
would require larger price and/or
yield declines to trigger payments.
POLICY IMPLICATIONS
Matching up policy tools with
policy objectives is critical for pro-
gram cost-efficiency. It is not sur-
prising that our current mix of
farm programs does a poor job of
matching program support and
market revenue shortfalls. These
programs are with us for a variety
of reasons: program inertia, oppor-
tunism concerning budget scoring,
and WTO considerations. They are
not the result of a deliberate pro-
cess of choosing program instru-
ments for their efficiency in
meeting program objectives.
Judging the 2002 Farm Bill
Continued from page 3
A more deliberate process
would reveal that our commodity
programs consist of two programs
that protect against low prices, one
program that delivers aid even
when farm income is at an all-time
high, and an ad hoc disaster system
that pays out when regional produc-
tion is low. In addition, we have a
crop insurance program that also
pays out when low yields or low
prices occur and that offers a pro-
gram, GRIP, that could easily be
modified to replace all commodity
and crop insurance programs for
major field crops.
Rationalizing commodity, disas-
ter, and crop insurance programs
by replacing them with a single-pay-
ment program based on a modifica-
tion of GRIP would increase
program transparency, eliminate
program duplication, reduce admin-
istrative costs, and largely eliminate
over- and undercompensation of
farmers. Perhaps budget pressures
will lead congressional leaders and
farm groups to take a fresh look at
the current structure of farm pro-
grams with an eye toward increas-
ing the efficiency of taxpayer
support for farm income. ◆
ket loss assistance payments, and
price support programs for dairy,
sugar, and peanuts each account
for roughly 20 percent of the sup-
port. Crop insurance represents 5
percent, while other agricultural
programs contribute the remaining
9 percent.
The end results of the cotton
dispute are still uncertain. How Con-
gress and the administration will
respond to this ruling, either in
modifying the current farm bill or in
creating the next farm bill, is un-
known. But the cotton ruling, com-
bined with the federal budget
pressures we are now seeing in the
United States, has the potential to
set off substantial changes in U.S.
agricultural policy. ◆
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